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[1]吴文清,于可心,刘文诣,等. 公平偏好下的科技企业孵化器与创投合作研究[J].天津大学学报(社会科学版),2018,(2):116-120.
 Wu Wenqing,Yu Kexin,Liu Wenyi,et al. Study on Cooperation Between Business Incubator and Venture Capital from the Perspective of Fairness Preference[J].Journal of Tianjin University(Social Science),2018,(2):116-120.
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 公平偏好下的科技企业孵化器与创投合作研究()
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《天津大学学报(社会科学版)》[ISSN:1008-4339/CN:12-1290/c]

卷:
期数:
2018年2期
页码:
116-120
栏目:
现代企业管理
出版日期:
2018-03-15

文章信息/Info

Title:
 Study on Cooperation Between Business Incubator and Venture
Capital from the Perspective of Fairness Preference
作者:
 吴文清 于可心 刘文诣 李超群
 天津大学管理与经济学部, 天津300072
Author(s):
 Wu Wenqing Yu Kexin Liu Wenyi Li Chaoqun
 College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
关键词:
 科技企业孵化器 创投 公平偏好 博弈
Keywords:
 business incubator venture capital fairness preference game
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
 将公平偏好引入到创业投资企业和科技企业孵化器的博弈过程中,分析了创投和科技企业孵化器Stackelberg博弈下的最优均衡,讨论了公平偏好下创投向孵化器利润分享比例、孵化器努力工作概率以及政府税收强度和财政返还强度等因素对双方均衡的影响。研究表明,仅科技企业孵化器具有公平偏好时,对创投要求的最优分配比例随自身对公平偏好程度的增加而增加;仅考虑创投具有公平偏好时,当具有的公平偏好程度较小时,创投对孵化器最优分配比例相应提高;当创投具有的公平偏好程度较大时,创投对孵化器最优分配比例应相应降低。政府财政税收政策会影响最优均衡的临界点。
Abstract:
 By introducing fairness preference into the game between venture capital firm and business incubator, this paper analyzes the optimal equilibrium in the Stackelberg game. From the perspective of the faire preference, the paper then discusses the profit sharing ratio of incubator, the probability of business incubators hard work, and the influence of tax revenue and fiscal return on the equilibrium of both sides. The research shows that if only the business incubator has the fair preference, its requirement on the optimal allocation ratio increases with its increasing preference for fairness. When the fair preference of venture capital is smaller, the optimal allocation ratio of business incubator will be increased; and when its fairness preference is larger, the optimal allocation ratio of business incubator will be reduced correspondingly. The government fiscal and tax policy will affect the critical point of optimal equilibrium.

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